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this institution from the same position in society. The book's failure 
to recognize and explore this difference is a weakness that preserves 
the marginalization of non-lesbian women and lesbians in legal 
discourse. 
Similarly, the authors fail to explore the intersection of race, 
gender, and sexual orientation. There is no acknowledgement in 
the book of the diversity of experiences of lesbians and gay men. 
In short, while I have some criticisms of this work, the authors 
are to be commended for choosing to focus on the issue of sexual 
orientation and the law for serious analysis. However, their failure 
to question heterosexist assumptions about culture and society per-
petuates the essential invisibility of lesbians and gay men. 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY. By Michael J. Glen-
non.' Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
1990. Pp. 353. Cloth, $35.00. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS. By Louis Henkin.2 New York and Ox-
ford: Columbia University Press. 1990. Pp. 125. Cloth, 
$24.50. 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHAR-
ING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. By 
Harold Hongju Koh.3 New Haven: Yale University Press. 
1990. Pp. 340. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $14.95. 
Robert G. Kaufman 4 
These books address a subject fraught with a long history of 
controversy, the constitutional dimension of American foreign pol-
icy. Since 1793, when President Washington risked war by declar-
ing neutrality in violation of a treaty with France, presidents and 
the Congress have continued to debate their respective legal powers 
in the realm of foreign affairs. 5 The executive branch has consist-
I. Professor of Law, University of California Davis, School of Law. 
2. University Professor Emeritus and Special Service Professor, Columbia University. 
3. Professor of Law, Yale University. 
4. Bradley Resident Fellow, the Heritage Foundation. 
5. For an excellent discussion of the origins of this controversy, see R. TUCKER & D. 
HENDRICKSON, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: THE STATECRAFT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 48·63 
(1990). 
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ently claimed that the Commander and Chief Clause and rights in-
herent in sovereignty give presidents authority to use force, to take 
actions which risk war, and to make international agreements, even 
without congressional consent. The legislative branch has claimed 
that article I grants the Congress primacy in the making of war and 
foreign policy, so that unilateral executive action in these areas vio-
lates the constitutional mandate of shared powers. 
Scholarly opinion on this subject has moved in cycles, reflect-
ing shifts in the prevalent world-view of American liberals. From 
the New Deal until the Vietnam War, the regnant theory was that 
broad executive power in the areas of foreign policy and national 
security is constitutionally sound and politically wise. Then dissat-
isfaction with the Vietnam War led to a new orthodoxy: Congress 
and the courts must restore the proper constitutional balance by re-
constraining Presidents from exercising "untrammelled national se-
curity power." This movement reached its apotheosis with the War 
Powers Act of 1973 ("the Act"). Passed over President Nixon's 
veto, considered unconstitutional by every president since, the Act 
limits the duration of involvement of any U.S. armed forces in hos-
tilities or in situations where hostilities are clearly imminent, unless 
Congress allows it, or U.S. forces or territory come under attack. 
The analyses of Professors Michael Glennon, Louis Henkin, 
and Harold Hongju Koh all exemplify the new orthodoxy. Each 
considers excessive executive power to be the fundamental constitu-
tional and practical problem for American foreign policy today. 
Each castigates Congress and the courts for ceding to presidents too 
much constitutional authority. Although these books preceded 
President Bush's deployment of troops and warships in the Persian 
Gulf, each bears directly on that crisis, and the constitutional 
problems arising from it. Alas, the authors' analyses are less per-
suasive than their subject was timely. Koh and Glennon base their 
argument on flawed reasoning, dubious and selective constitutional 
history, and even more dubious policy judgments. Henkin adopts a 
more nuanced approach and reaches more balanced conclusions. 
Ultimately, however, his argument also fails because his policy pre-
scriptions do not follow from his questionable premises. 
Glennon and Koh emphasize that the Constitution grants the 
president only paltry war-making authority, compared with the ex-
tensive powers article I grants the Congress. Relying on the Advise 
and Consent Clause, both also argue that presidents' extensive reli-
ance on executive agreements has usurped Congress's constitutional 
role in the process of formulating U.S. foreign policy. Glennon and 
Koh also base their argument on their reading of the Federalist Pa-
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pers and court decisions. From the obviously valid premise that the 
framers intended to limit the exercise of arbitrary national security 
authority, both authors reach the questionable conclusion that pres-
idents lack the constitutional authority to risk war, undertake cov-
ert action, or interpret treaties, without express congressional 
consent. Both recognize, grudgingly, the constitutional problems 
that Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha poses for 
the legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution, an act which they 
lament has not done enough to curb the executive. To strengthen 
the act, both recommend amendments to make it even more diffi-
cult for presidents to dispatch forces abroad without congressional 
consent. Both thus endorse a variant of S.2, a proposal which Sena-
tors Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and Mitchell introduced in 1989. This 
bill would replace the War Powers Act's unconstitutional automatic 
requirement for withdrawal of troops after sixty days with an expe-
dited process for a joint resolution authorizing the action or requir-
ing disengagement. Further, it would require the president to 
consult regularly with a standing congressional core group. In ad-
dition, both authors urge Congress to strengthen statutory controls 
requiring consultation about and centralized congressional over-
sight over covert operations and treaty making. As both Glennon 
and Koh recognize, their preferred outcome requires that courts en-
force executive compliance, which Congress can accomplish by stat-
utory directive or the Supreme Court can facilitate by abandoning 
its "excessive" reliance on the political question doctrine in cases 
involving foreign policy. 
Glennon and Koh seem to consider unconstitutional virtually 
every presidential use of armed force without explicit congressional 
consent. Henkin is more moderate: he defends the constitutionality 
of the Vietnam War, stressing that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
authorized it. Nor does he believe that the framers' intentions and 
the text of the Constitution resolve these questions as clearly as 
Glennon and Koh suggest. He argues that not just the presidents, 
but the judiciary and the Congress have aggrandized their constitu-
tional powers and developed large extraconstitutional powers. Still, 
his interpretation of the framers' intent and his policy judgments 
closely correspond with theirs. He bases his argument for greater 
congressional and judicial assertiveness in foreign affairs on two 
competing principles: greater democratization; and the need, im-
plicit in constitutionalism, to limit arbitrary power. 
None of these authors makes a cogent case. What they demol-
ish is a caricature, a theory of absolute executive prerogative which 
no executive has ever claimed. There are two related but separate 
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issues involved in separation of powers questions, which the authors 
sometimes treat as synonymous. One, what is the proper allocation 
of authority? Two, when should courts enforce that allocation? 
On the first question, there are powerful justifications for 
granting the president much greater national security power than 
the authors recognize. Begin with the constitutional text. Article II 
defines the office of the presidency only vaguely; article I defines the 
responsibilities of Congress more extensively. These provisions 
leave many issues unresolved. What is executive action? What is 
the scope of the advise and consent power? Do all resorts to force 
require a declaration of war, or prior congressional consent? What, 
if any, is the distinction between the authority to declare war, and 
the broader authority to make war, which the framers decided after 
debate not to grant the Congress? Reasonable people can disagree, 
then, about the textual allocation of national security authority. Or 
as Edward Corwin aptly put it: the Constitution is an invitation to 
struggle for the privilege of directing our foreign policy.6 
What does the concept of separation of powers tell us about the 
problem? This inquiry requires reasoning, not from the individual 
meanings of the words in the text, but from the structure of govern-
ment established by the text. 1 Glennon, Koh, and Henkin interpret 
article II's reticence about executive power restrictively, but an ex-
pansive interpretation is even more plausible. One can construe the 
"herein granted" language of article I as limiting congressional au-
thority. Conversely, the absence of this language in article II sug-
gests that the executive has the responsibility for foreign policy 
arising from the prerogative of sovereignty, subject only to article 
l's specific, not implied, limits. s After the dismal failure of the Arti-
cles of Confederation, the framers recognized that an effective for-
eign policy required a strong executive, capable of decision, activity, 
secrecy, and dispatch. They considered Congress ill-suited for these 
tasks. This is why the Constitutional Convention rejected the idea 
of giving Congress the authority to make war in favor of the more 
limited grant of authority to declare war.9 
Precedent also supports the idea that the executive branch pos-
sesses a unilateral prerogative to respond to aggression with force. 
Since 1789, the President has sent troops or arms abroad more than 
6. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 201 (5th ed. 1964). 
7. See THE FETIERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH (L. Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989). 
8. See L. Crovitz, Micromanaging Foreign Policy, 102 THE PUBLIC INTEREST No. 100 
(Summer, 1990). 
9. See Sofaer, Separation of Powers and the Use of Force, in CRovrrz & RABKIN, supra 
at 16. 
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200 times, while Congress has declared war on only five occasions. 
To be sure, in some of these cases Congress may be said to have 
authorized the president's action, but presidents acted without spe-
cific congressional authorization in two-thirds of the uses of force 
abroad without a declaration of war.IO 
As even the most ardent proponents of executive power con-
cede, the president should not have absolute authority in foreign 
affairs or national security policy. Nevertheless, Glennon, Henkin, 
and Koh slight the effective constitutional and political mechanisms 
which Congress has always had at its disposal in these areas. There 
is the power over the purse, which no president, including Nixon, 
has challenged. However ambiguous their contours, the Declara-
tion of War and Advise and Consent Clauses circumscribe the fre-
quency and extent of arbitrary executive action. There are also 
political restraints: If the Vietnam War proved anything, it is that 
presidents cannot ignore Congress and public opinion, without 
courting political disaster. Why are further restraints on executive 
power necessary? 
One answer for the authors, is that lately our presidents have 
been doing things of which the authors disapprove. Worse, Con-
gress and the public have generally supported presidents' using 
force abroad, if not affirmatively then at least by acquiescence. This 
being so, judicial intervention seems necessary to save us from presi-
dents like Reagan.11 But if the president's powers depend on 
whether one approves of his use of those powers, what is the point 
of constitutional theory? 
As an example of this result-oriented jurisprudence, consider 
Professor Glennon's analysis of the president's authority to enforce 
treaties. He argues astonishingly that the NATO Treaty actually 
amounted to a bluff, because the president could not enforce the 
American obligation without a formal congressional decision to de-
clare war. 
This argument flies in the face of long-established law and pre-
cedent. Treaties are the supreme law of the land. By consenting to 
the NATO Treaty, the Senate clearly authorized the president to 
fulfill our responsibilities thereunder, until the Senate acted to ratify 
or reject his decision. The framers explicitly recognized the execu-
tive's authority to respond to sudden attack without prior congres-
10. Ibid. 
II. A revisionist interpretation of U.S. foreign policy underlies the analysis and policy 
prescriptions of all three authors. Their polemical treatment of Ronald Reagan and neuralgic 
criticism of his decisions to use force in the Persian Gulf, Libya, and Grenada highlight this 
in bold relief. 
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sional approval. This principle surely extends to enforcing treaty 
obligations to which the Senate has given its formal advice and con-
sent. In the case of NATO, all American presidents have thought 
so. So, generally, had the American people, our allies, our potential 
adversaries, and the Congress. When occasionally legislators have 
sought to limit the president's discretion, presidents have prevailed, 
as Senator Taft found out when he objected to President Truman's 
decision to deploy four divisions in Europe unilaterally after North 
Korea attacked the South in 1950. True, President Washington 
warned against entangling alliances, but as a matter of policy, not 
constitutional doctrine. The framers intended to make alliances dif-
ficult, but not to rule out altogether a security option which they 
recognized as vital in certain circumstances. 
Contradictions also abound in Glennon's analysis of the treaty 
power. On the one hand, he defends the constitutionality of Presi-
dent Carter's abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with 
the Chiang government. On the other hand, he rebukes President 
Reagan for rejecting the Senate's interpretation of the ABM Treaty, 
even though the Soviet Union, the other Treaty party, also did not 
subscribe or adhere to the Senate's interpretation. Glennon's posi-
tions are hard to reconcile: The act of interpreting a treaty is a 
much more modest claim of executive power than the act of abro-
gating one. Again, Glennon's policy preferences seem to resolve 
this apparent paradox. He favored the recognition of Red China. 
He opposes SDI. 
Glennon and Koh also shift the premises of their legal theories 
to achieve their preferred results. Arguing for an executive with 
limited powers in foreign affairs, both invoke original intent and 
construe the text of the Constitution restrictively. Arguing for 
broad congressional powers to make foreign policy, both happily 
discard the principles of original intent and strict construction by 
inferring powers which the Constitution does not explicitly confer. 
Their interpretation of the leading Supreme Court decisions 
and their argument for a more assertive judiciary betray similar in-
consistencies and logical flaws. The courts have long deferred to 
presidents exercising wide unilateral powers in the areas of national 
security and foreign affairs. In United States v. Curtiss- Wright Ex-
port Corp. , the Court recognized the plenary and exclusive powers 
of the president as the sole organ of the federal government in for-
eign affairs. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, also distin-
guished separation of powers controversies involving foreign policy 
from those involving domestic affairs: "Assuming that the chal-
lenged delegation, if it were confined to internal affairs, would be 
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invalid, may it nevertheless be sustained on the grounds that its ex-
clusive aim is to afford a remedy for a hurtful condition within a 
foreign territory?" The Court said yes. According to Sutherland, 
the president may exercise foreign policy powers not explicitly 
granted to him in the Constitution as a necessary prerogative of 
sovereignty. Sutherland did not claim, as Koh and Glennon imply, 
that the president has unlimited authority. Rather, Sutherland 
stressed "the very delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis 
for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every 
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to 
the applicable provisions of the Constitution." 
Glennon, Koh, and Henkin consider Curtiss- Wright's reason-
ing spurious and anomalous. As they see it, courts ought to apply 
rigorously Justice Jackson's tripartite formula, which he set forth in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer for resolving separation of 
powers disputes: 1. When a president acts pursuant to express or 
limited authorization of Congress, his authority is at a minimum. 
2. When the president acts in the absence of either a constitutional 
grant or a denial of authority, he can rely on his own independent 
powers, but there is a twilight in which he and the Congress may 
have concurrent authority. 3. When the president takes measures 
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its lowest ebb, for there he can rely on his own constitu-
tional power minus any constitutional power of Congress over the 
matter. 
The Court's reasoning in Youngstown does not support the au-
thors' assertion that presidents have routinely exceeded their consti-
tutional authority in the area of foreign affairs. In Youngstown, six 
Justices (three concurrers and three dissenters) sustained Curtis-
Wright's vision of the president's authority in foreign affairs. Jus-
tice Jackson envisaged Youngstown as a domestic separation of pow-
ers controversy: "I shall indulge in the widest latitude of 
interpretation to sustain ... [the president's] exclusive executive 
function to command the instruments of national force, at least 
when turned against the outside world for the security of our soci-
ety. But when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion, but 
because of lawful economic struggle between industry and labor, it 
shall go no farther." Similarly, the logic of Justice Frankfurter's 
concurrence supports the executive branch's prerogative to use 
armed force unilaterally in a wide array of circumstances: he ar-
gued that a systematic, unbroken executive practice long before 
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pursued with the knowledge of Congress and never before ques-
tioned, engaged in by presidents who have sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the 
structure of government, must be treated as a gloss of the Executive 
Power vested in the president by article II. Justice Clark also de-
fined the power of the Executive broadly, while the dissenters-Jus-
tices Minton, Reed, and Vinson-would have sustained Truman's 
seizure of the steel mill. 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have repudiated the au-
thors' broad reading of Youngstown. Generally, the courts have 
simply refused to hear separation of powers cases involving foreign 
affairs, invoking the political question doctrine.12 When judges 
have decided such cases on the merits, resounding majorities have 
generally upheld executives' claims of broad national security pow-
ers.13 Glennon and Koh argue that the political question doctrine 
should not be so broadly interpreted, but their analysis is sharply at 
odds with the selective original intent analysis by which they judge 
the executive branch. Witness, for example, their coolness to the 
Court's reasoning in Chadha, even though the majority relied on 
strict construction of the Constitution to strike down legislative ve-
toes such as those contained in the War Powers Resolution. 
Professor Henkin's analysis avoids this blatant double-stan-
dard, but suffers from an equally severe shortcoming: once he dis-
cards original intent as a standard of analysis, he lacks a compelling 
criterion for evaluating separation of powers controversies. His 
formula of democracy, accountability, and protection against arbi-
trary authority is hopelessly vague and subjective. Nor, even if one 
accepts this formula, do his prescriptions follow from his premises. 
According to Henkin, the need for greater accountability in and de-
mocratization of the making of foreign policy require greater con-
gressional involvement. Actually, the opposite is true. In foreign 
affairs, where prompt and decisive action are often essential, the ex-
ecutive has a greater claim to primacy than in any other field. The 
executive branch has the capacity, vital in foreign affairs, to initiate 
action: Congress generally performs best in its oversight function, 
as a reactive institution. While congressional authority is diffuse 
and its procedures ponderous, presidential authority is unitary, hi-
erarchical, and centralized. Legislators have unique and limited 
constituencies; the president, in contrast, represents the nation. 
Where numbers and procedures blur accountability for 535 legisla-
12. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
13. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
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tors making foreign policy, the public can draw a clear link between 
executive action and responsibility. 
Obsessed by executive power and writing from a narrow legal 
perspective, the authors seem oblivious to the dangers of an Impe-
rial Congress or a paralyzed government. Yet these dangers are 
real. A combination of developments over the past two decades-
notably the weakening of political parties and the Watergate re-
forms-has shifted the institutional balance of power away from the 
executive and congressional leadership to the individual legislators 
themselves. There are now more than 25 subcommittees in both 
houses dealing with foreign policy, with which the president must 
negotiate. This is the Congress to which our authors would like to 
assign even greater power! 
Congress, of course, has a vital role to play in making foreign 
policy. The framers wisely did not consider efficiency an absolute 
value. Constitutionalism presupposes some inefficiencies as the 
price of limited government, protection of individual liberties, and 
popular sovereignty. In the long run, moreover, these apparent in-
efficiencies may better reflect and achieve a nation's interest than 
the superficial efficiency of closed societies. Congress performs an 
essential constitutional function in its capacity for oversight, for dis-
sent and debate, and for reflecting various strata of public opinion. 
Institutionally, it serves as a salutary check on the excesses of the 
executive branch. 
The problem is to strike a reasonable balance. Suppose, for the 
sake of argument, that the Constitution permits, even if it does not 
mandate, the types of restrictions on presidential authority that the 
authors want. We should still reject them. Historically, an effective 
American foreign policy has depended on a president able to lead. 
The Cold War consensus and the Imperial Presidency, which the 
authors malign, succeeded in taming the nation's most dangerous 
and relentless adversary at less cost and risk than even the most 
optimistic observers had a right to hope. Similarly the most effec-
tive periods of American foreign policy before the Second World 
War coincided with and probably depended on strong executive 
leadership in foreign affairs. In the post-Cold War era, the pros-
pects for creating and sustaining a stable and prosperous world or-
der will continue to depend on an executive branch that is able to 
act vigorously in foreign affairs, as recent events in the Middle East 
eloquently attest. 
Of course presidents have blundered and lied from time to 
time. The same can be said of any institution with power. What we 
need is a judicious appraisal of the relative performance of the two 
330 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:321 
branches, in the long perspective of history. Our authors fail to pro-
vide this. They ignore the story of how congressional isolationism 
nearly crippled President Roosevelt's correct and critical effort to 
resist Hitler. Nor, to cite another obvious example, do they men-
tion the malignant effects of Senator McCarthy on the conduct of 
American foreign affairs. Lacking the historical long view, they re-
main traumatized by the anti-war version of the Vietnam experi-
ence, which the boatpeople, glasnost, and the demand for freedom 
in Eastern Europe should have utterly discredited. Their legalistic 
prescriptions would divert the proper focus of the enduring and 
necessary foreign policy debate away from the realm of politics, 
where it belongs, to the courts of law, where it does not. 
POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS AND DI-
PLOMACY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. By Paul 
Gordon Lauren.I Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1988. 
Pp. xv, 388. Cloth $50.50; paper, $19.95. 
Mary L. Dudziak2 
Professor Paul Gordon Lauren takes on an ambitious task: an 
examination of the importance of race and racism in international 
politics and diplomacy, particularly in the twentieth century. The 
result is a well written and carefully researched study of the impact 
of racial ideologies and racist practices on world events. 
Although at times he paints with a rather broad brush, discuss-
ing major political and ideological developments with great brevity, 
the strength of Professor Lauren's book is that it brings so many 
different pieces together. We can view Plessy v. Ferguson, for exam-
ple, not only in the context of American racism in the 1890s, from 
lynching to the massacre at Wounded Knee, but also in the context 
of European racial theories, and of efforts to promote white 
supremacy in Australia and Canada through restrictive immigra-
tion laws. By adopting this comparative perspective, Lauren is able 
to isolate factors that he believes influenced policies on race. 
The book begins with an historical overview of white racism, 
from the assumptions of racial inequality held by Aristotle and 
Saint Augustine to the "scientific" racism of the nineteenth century. 
Ideas about racial differences had profound consequences when 
I. Professor and Director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center, University of 
Montana. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
